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Abstract
Purpose – This article studies the tensions between universities’ accountability and autonomy in response to
the demands of public steering mechanisms coordinating higher education institutions.
Design/methodology/approach – Demonstrating the tension between accountability and autonomy, the
impact and relevance of public steering mechanisms coordinating higher education are studied via a survey
with selected representative Finnish universities. The response ratewas an exceptionally high 94%. In addition
to the statistical analysis of the survey, open-ended questions were also analyzed to give a more in-depth
understanding of the findings. The study uses paradox theory and institutional complexity as its theoretical
lenses.
Findings – The empirical analysis of this study shows a considerable gap between the experienced impact
and the experienced relevance of the steering mechanisms in higher education. The authors’ further analysis
of the open-ended data shows that indicator-based funding allocation has undermined the perceived
university autonomy. The authors highlight the paradoxical tensions of university autonomy and higher
education institutions’ steering mechanisms’ requirement for accountability. Finding an acceptable balance
between accountability and institutional autonomy plays an important role in designing higher education
policies.
Originality/value –The authors found that even if a steeringmechanism is experienced as impactful, it is not
necessarily considered relevant. One of the key aspects in understanding the reasons behind this mismatch is
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they also endanger institutional autonomy. In this sense, it could be expected that steering mechanisms should
better balance accountability and autonomy.
Keywords Higher education development, Steering mechanisms, Paradox theory, Institutional complexity,
Public funding, Universities
Paper type Research paper
1. Introduction
Over the past few decades, several countries that have traditionally relied on the state-led
coordination of higher education have been increasingly developing their steering
mechanisms to better correspond with the goals of the changing higher education field
(e.g. Enders et al., 2013; Ferlie et al., 2009). While the funding of higher education institutions
(HEIs) in these countries is typically provided largely by the tax revenues, the allocation of
funding as such is increasingly based on the mimicking of market coordination (e.g. Brown,
2010; Marginson, 2013). The abovementioned redesign of public coordination has affected
most of the Western world.
The reasons for redeveloping the public coordination of higher education are numerous
and country-specific. However, in global terms, there are also megatrends that have had an
indisputable effect in this phenomenon. Perhaps the most evident of these include the
global spread of the New Public Management doctrine (Hood, 1995; Miller et al., 1998; Pollitt
and Bouckaert, 2004; Vakkuri, 2010); the growing public interest in international rankings
and their effect on HEIs’ competition for status, students and faculty (Czarniawska, 2019;
Gebreiter and Hidayah, 2019; Mingers and Willmott, 2013; Northcott and Linacre, 2010;
Pidd and Broadbent, 2015; Shore, 2008; Tourish et al., 2017; Tourish andWillmott, 2015); the
growing importance of national and international accreditations (Ahrens and Khalifa, 2015;
Alvesson et al., 2017; Czarniawska, 2019; Dobija et al., 2019); and increasing demands for
transparency and accountability in higher education (e.g. Kivist€o et al., 2019; Pinheiro et al.,
2019). Moreover, one should not overlook the effect of public sector isomorphism, or in
simpler terms, the tendency of public sector organizations to mimic each other and to copy
practices from other sectors and countries (Kallio et al., 2020). All the abovementioned
trends affecting the redevelopment of the public coordination of higher education are
mutually interconnected and make studying the steering of HEIs a prominent research
agenda.
These trends also force most of the HEIs, especially the publicly funded ones, to heed
accountability to the state much more than previously (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015). In
the Finnish context, Kallio et al. (2020) recently described the tension emerging from the fact
that the state expects universities to develop their strategic planning while their funding
scheme is simultaneously so strictly tied to public steering mechanisms that strategic
management is impossible. This interpretation is backed up by further evidence of several
national-level studies and evaluations. In particular, in the national “Impact Evaluation of the
Universities Act Reform” (see Owal Group, 2016), it was concluded that the funding scheme,
its indicators and its weight in determining the levels of universities’ fundingwere considered
too detailed, thereby constraining the universities’ ability in setting their goals. This
assumption is further reinforced by the findings from the 2015 evaluation of the Finnish
higher education system and theOrganisation for Economic Co-operation andDevelopment’s
(OECD’s) review of the Finnish innovation policy in 2017 (Melin et al., 2015; OECD, 2017).
Nevertheless, while this tension has been reported in previous studies, the question of why
the steering mechanisms are causing tension has not been explicitly studied. The steering
mechanisms of HEIs stem mainly from a managerialist background, creating paradoxes of
governance in HEIs (Kallio et al., 2021). In this study, we apply the lenses of institutional
complexity and paradox theory (Schad et al., 2016) to recognize and study the tensions within
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the steering mechanisms. Instead of trying to resolve the tensions, paradox theory deals with
the different ways to cope with the competing demands (Smith and Tracey, 2016).
It is the abovementioned tension that is the focus of this article. Thus, there are three
objectives for the article, as follows:
(1) To highlight the steeringmechanisms applied in coordinating Finnish HEIs aswell as
to report their experienced impact and relevance.
(2) To gain understanding of why the applied steering mechanisms cause tension for the
management of HEIs.
(3) To provide further practical insight into how to develop the public steering of
universities based on the previous two objectives.
In our analysis, we focus particularly on the fields of business and economics, engineering,
the humanities and social sciences. The results of the empirical findings are viewed from the
theoretical frameworks of the paradox theory (e.g. Fairhurst et al., 2016; Schad et al., 2016) and
institutional complexity (e.g. Greenwood et al., 2011). By using the two mentioned
frameworks in tandem, we aim to achieve rich, generative theorizing to better address the
key challenges highlighted.
The article centers on education provided by Finnish universities and touches on
universities’ research activities only implicitly. The article is based on unique data collected
by the Finnish Education Evaluation Centre (FINEEC) in 2019 as part of its extensive
external evaluation of the four fields. Bearing in mind the obvious limitations caused by the
fact that higher education systems and their respective steering mechanisms differ between
countries, the results of this study can be useful beyond the Finnish context when assessing,
designing and developing steering mechanisms to coordinate higher education
organizations. The results of this study can be extended to cover other contexts that are
structurally similar with the system-level coordination of Finnish universities, that is,
especially those countries that are applying a mixture of performance-based funding and
performance contracts in university funding and hold a strong regulative position of the
degree-awarding rights of the universities (cf. Ahonen and Koljonen, 2020). In Europe, this
means not just the most obvious cases, such as the other Nordic countries (Pinheiro et al.,
2019), but also several other countries (see, e.g. de Boer et al., 2015; Claeys-Kulik and
Estermann, 2015; Bennetot-Pruvot and Estermann, 2017). Moreover, the results can be
comparatively examined together with other countries sharing sufficient similarities. In
addition to the findings related to the steering of HEIs and their policy goals, our study also
has relevance for the theoretical analyses of public sector institutions’ autonomy contrasted
to their accountability pressures as well as the competing and even paradoxical institutional
logics (de Boer et al., 2015; Grossi et al., 2020; Kallio et al., 2020; Modell, 2019; Verhoest et al.,
2004). With these insights, we participate in the expanding literature on institutional
complexity and paradoxes within the public sector domain (Schad et al., 2016; Smith and
Tracey, 2016).
2. Background
2.1 Steering of higher education
Themanagement and governance of HEIs have proven to be a prominent research agenda for
over a decade. In higher education, steering can be defined as those “externally derived
instruments and institutional arrangements which seek to govern organisational and
academic behaviours”within HEIs (Ferlie et al., 2009, p. 2). Broadbent (2007) emphasizes that
the steering of HEIs is an interplay between their organizations and their regulatory and





measurement (PM) system is away tomanage universities, we havewitnessedHEIs adopting
increasingly more fine-grained and strict PM practices to enable the auditing of the efficiency
and quality of operations (Agyemang and Broadbent, 2015).
In recent years, various studies have reported on these PM practices and the ways that
HEIs have implemented them (Kallio and Kallio, 2014; Kallio et al., 2016, 2017; ter Bogt and
Scapens, 2012). ter Bogt and Scapens (2012) note that the external standardization of the
criteria for excellence has become increasingly central in HEIs today. However, the
institutionalization of these new models is not complete in many cases, and different types of
critique and resistance have been shown (Boitier and Riviere, 2013; Siltaloppi et al., 2019).
Some authors have argued that such quantified evaluation criteria result in the
overvalorization of quantity over quality (Kallio et al., 2017) or that evaluations become
constrained by standardized scores based on rankings and ratings (Lane, 2010). These
developments also challenge the traditional collegial view of universities. Something that
Craig et al. (2014, p. 2) call the “mania for constant assessment” is challenging the traditional
and collegial visions of a university with managerial power and its legitimation. In many
cases, the commercial values are changing the universities’ governance, accountability,
decision-making and communication (Parker, 2002; Parker and Guthrie, 2010). In addition,
the rapidly expanding implementation of rankings, accreditations, quality assurance and
frameworks for excellence is affecting the steering of HEIs (Grossi et al., 2019; see also Guthrie
and Neumann, 2007; Parker and Guthrie, 2010).
Finland has experienced the same type of development, as will be explained in the
following sections. Internationally, the adoption of the HEI steering mechanisms in Finland
has been one result of a modernization trend that has touched most higher education systems
in Western countries (e.g. Kallio et al., 2017, 2020; Kivist€o et al., 2017; Suomi et al., 2014;
Pinheiro et al., 2019; Iacuzzi et al., 2020). More recently, this trend has also expanded into the
East, the Middle East and Africa (e.g. Harun et al., 2020; Komutputipong and
Keerasuntonpong, 2019; Upping and Oliver, 2012; Mah’d, 2020; Mkasiwa, 2020).
2.2 Institutional complexity and paradox theory as lenses to understand opposing demands
in the steering of HEIs
As suggested above, FinnishHEIs struggle with conflicting demands. In their analysis, Smith
and Tracey (2016) identify two theoretical frameworks, namely institutional complexity and
paradox theory, which have been widely applied by scholars for understanding such a
situation. These two theoretical frameworks have been developingmostly independently and
have certain differences in the way that they see the source and the nature as well as the
challenges and responses with respect to competing demands (Smith and Tracey, 2016).
According to Greenwood et al. (2011), organizations face institutional complexity when
there are two or more competing institutional logics affecting them – a situation in which the
Finnish HEIs find themselves. There is an array of ways to describe and label the competing
logics in academia, such as academic logic and market logic (Juusola et al., 2015), professional
and market-oriented logic (Mampaey and Huisman, 2015), managerialism and
professionalism (Chandler, 2008; Pettersen, 2015) or even institutional and business bubble
perspectives (Alajoutsij€arvi et al., 2014). While there may be even more competing logics
involved – mainly because Finnish universities are increasingly collaborating with and
receiving funding frommultiple stakeholders – in this study, we focus on the three competing
logics: two distinct variants of state logic, labeled here as constitutional logic and quasi-
market logic, as well as professional logic.
In Finland, the higher education field is highly regulated by the state, and the state logic
thus plays an important role in the organizational field (Thornton et al., 2012). While the state
has lately pursued increasing the autonomy of universities, there are still strict regulations
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that define – in nuanced ways – numerous issues ranging from the organizational
configurations and administrative structures of the universities to their right to provide
education (Kallio et al., 2020; see also Karran, 2009; Piiroinen, 2013). Nevertheless, even
though state logic is significant in the Finnish HEI sector, the scientific independence and
academic freedom of universities and individual scholars have traditionally been perceived
as highly important principles in the country (Aarrevaara, 2010). As a manifestation of this
importance, these principles have been written into the constitution of the country: “The
freedom of science, the arts, and higher education is guaranteed” (Constitution of Finland,
section 16). This type of state logic can be labeled as constitutional logic to distinguish it from
another type of state logic – quasi-marked logic – affecting the Finnish HEIs.
In the Finnish higher education field, the demands with respect to market logic originate
mostly from the Finnish Ministry of Education and Culture (MEC). The MEC applies six
steering mechanisms, of which four are tied to funding, as we shall show in more detail in the
following sections. Given the situation, the second logic affecting HEIs can be labeled as
quasi-market logic (Feiock, 2002; Exworthy et al., 1999) since it is dictated by the state and
thus instead of being actual marked logic, it is in fact a variant of state logic. The demand for
public sector organizations to mimic the private sector service provision resulting in creating
quasi-markets for higher education is increasingly common in those countries in which
universities are not typically private-owned, students do not have to pay tuition and the
funding for universities is mostly provided by the tax revenues (e.g. Brown, 2010; Marginson,
2013). In Finland and in other Nordic countries, the dominant quasi-market element is more
the performance competition between HEIs than the “customer-orientation” and “consumer
demand” reflecting quality differences (see Verhoest et al., 2004). As described by Verhoest
et al. (2004), even if a university has full decision-making competencies for its management
and policy, government influences the actual decisions since the universities depend on the
government for a substantial part of their funding. Thus, the actual capacity of universities to
use their decision-making power is severely constrained.
The third logic affecting the Finnish HEIs is professional logic (Thornton et al., 2012).
Professional logic is an important constituent of the Finnish higher education system and
manifested, among others, by the fact that universities’ autonomy is guaranteed in the
Universities Act (Kallio et al., 2020). Even if the individual professors in Finland might not
possess asmuch power as their colleagues, for instance, in Italy or Germany, Finnish scholars
are nevertheless active in making demands and ready to protest if they feel that their
scientific independence and academic freedom are being jeopardized (e.g. Kallio et al., 2020;
Siekkinen et al., 2020).
When logics are incompatible or competing, they generate challenges and tensions for the
organizations exposed to them (Greenwood et al., 2011). Many of the major tensions and
change dynamics observed in modern organizations and organizational fields can be
examined by considering the struggle among the various actors entangled in contrasting
institutional logics, such as the state and the universities. Reay and Hinings (2005) note that
competing logics can coexist in tension over an extended period, and one dominant logic can
emerge – but only temporarily. Battilana and Lee (2014) state that the different institutional
logics can be combined in a more robust way and create hybrid models. In this vein, Pache
and Santos (2013) note that hybrid organizations are typically those exposed to multiple
institutional logics for a lengthy period of time and that the logics they embody are not
always compatible (see also Kallio et al., 2021).
While the situation in which organizations face competing demands is in general
considered to be challenging, the theory of institutional complexity accepts the idea that
multiple logics can coexist more than just temporarily and that the logics may be
complementary; thus, they do not always need to be mutually contradictory (Smith and





further and sees that competing demands are inherent in organizations and organizational
systems. Schad et al. (2016) define paradox as a “persistent contradiction between
interdependent elements.”
Rather than trying to resolve them, paradox theory pursues finding ways to cope with the
competing demands and potentially even develop positive outcomes, such as creativity and
sustainability (Smith and Tracey, 2016). According to Smith and Tracey (2016, pp. 458–459),
“paradoxes emphasize a persistent, underlying relationship between opposing forces that
cannot be resolved, but must be accepted and accommodated.” The authors continue by
providing some simple, useful examples of this kind of tension in organizations, such as
“today and tomorrow” and “individuals and collectives,”where the very endeavors of trying
to resolve the opposite would hardly make sense. Nevertheless, paradox theory also accepts
the fact that tensions are not always synergistic but can be contradictory and dysfunctional
in organizations (Smith and Tracey, 2016).
Smith and Tracey (2016, p. 455) conclude their analysis by stating that the two
frameworks – institutional complexity and paradox theory – can be used in tandem and that
“drawing from both of these lenses will result in rich, generative theorizing to better address
key challenges in the world.” In this study, we follow this idea set forth by Smith and Tracey
(2016) and apply the two theoretical frameworks as lenses while conceptualizing our
empirical findings to highlight the tension between accountability and autonomy – a
characteristic in the steering of HEIs in many Western countries.
3. Empirical context, data collection and analysis
3.1 The context of the study: characteristics of the Finnish higher education system
The higher education system in Finland consists of two separate sectors, universities and
universities of applied sciences (Pirttil€a et al., 2020; Pyykk€o et al., 2020b; Sepp€al€a et al., 2020;
Wallenius et al., 2020). This article focuses on universities. After several mergers, there are
currently 13 universities in Finland. Finland has a strong tradition of being a Nordic welfare
state, which has affected the relationship between the state and HEIs. The Finnish higher
education sector has undergone a series of significant reforms during the last decade aimed to
enhance the autonomy and accountability of HEIs. Themost significant of these reforms was
the renewal of university legislation in 2010. Despite these reforms, Finnish HEIs are state-
dependent for their funding, and theMEC continues to be the most influential stakeholder for
HEIs. TheMEChas the authority to regulate the number of HEIs aswell as the structures and
names of the degrees. Moreover, the MEC steers the fields of education and sets targets for
degrees granted per institution. Quality assurance in Finnish higher education is based on
institutional audits, typically carried out by the FINEEC. Finland does not have program-
level accreditation for educational programs. The overall mode of quality assurance is
enhancement-oriented rather than accountability-oriented, and the audits do not lead to any
formal sanctions, such as reductions in state financing or rights to offer degrees. Universities
have the right to grant degrees in their respective fields of education as defined in a statute by
the Finnish Government (Pekkola and Kivist€o, 2019a).
No tuition fees are applied to domestic or EU/EEC students, but students outside of theETA
countries pay fees in bachelor’s and master’s programs. Because no tuition fees are charged,
around 92%of the funding for Finnish universities comes fromdomestic public sources (OECD,
2019). Of this, the share of the MEC’s funding, also called basic funding, is approximately 60%.
This basic funding is allocated via a strict performance-oriented scheme (Figure 1).
TheMEC’s funding scheme is designed to incentivize universities to operate in a way that
maximizes the number of degrees and pushes students to faster graduation. In addition, to a
lesser extent, the scheme rewards universities for increasing the employability of students














































































































































































































































































encourages researchers to publish in (highly ranked) international scientific journals. As
such, the allocation of basic funding in Finland is among the most performance-driven of the
EU countries (Kallunki et al., 2019).
3.2 The national steering of Finnish HEIs
In Finland, the activities of HEIs are based not only on the wide autonomy regarding
academic issues guaranteed by the Finnish Constitution but also on a continuous and active
interaction with the MEC. Consequently, the MEC devises the policy outlines, prepares the
regulations and allocates the state funding (MEC, 2021). Formally, state funding covers the
education and research activities of the universities, but in practice, for research,
the universities have to find financing from other sources (external funding), such as the
Academy of Finland, the EU and private foundations and corporations. All external research
funding is based on competition. However, competitive research funding is also one of the
funding indicators in the state model – making it a part of the steering scheme.
At the start of each four-year agreement period, each HEI and the MEC have negotiations
on the objectives for the higher education system, key measures for each HEI, strategic
funding and degree objectives, among others. The agreements also specify how the outcomes
of the agreed objectives are reported (Pekkola and Kivist€o, 2019b). Next, we introduce the six
steering mechanisms applied by the MEC, which are indicator-based funding, performance
agreements between the MEC and universities, strategy-based funding, project funding, the
regulation of the educational responsibility of the universities and steering by information.
Out of these six steering mechanisms, the first four are tied to funding, as explained below.
The indicator-based funding (1) allocated by the MEC to the universities is founded on a
performance-based funding scheme (Figure 1). Most of the indicator data for the funding
model are delivered automatically on a daily basis from the university data warehouses to the
national statistical service, Vipunen, maintained by the MEC and the Finnish National
Agency for Education (Vipunen, 2020). Funding is allocated as a single entity, and the
universities then independently decide on its internal allocation. The total amount of state
funding for universities is defined annually in the state budget.
Performance agreements between the MEC and universities (2) play an important role in
governmental steering in the Finnish higher education system. In the agreements, the MEC
and the universities agree on the following important areas for the four-year period: (1) the
objectives set for the higher education system as a whole; (2) the mission, profile and focus
areas of the HEI; (3) the key development measures linked to the implementation of the higher
education strategy; and (4) funding (indicator-based funding, strategy-based funding, project
funding and funding for specific national duties) (de Boer et al., 2015; MEC, 2021). Even
though performance agreements overlap with other steering mechanisms related to funding,
they have a distinct role in clarifying the profile of each institution and in assigning strategic
and specific national tasks to particular universities. de Boer et al. (2015) have suggested that
performance agreements stress the resource dependency of universities and limit their room
for making choices.
The basis for strategy-based funding (3) has been less transparent in comparison to the two
abovementioned steering mechanisms, where the amount has been agreed on in the
negotiations between the ministry and each university (MEC, 2021). Strategy-based funding
is based on the universities’ proposals, on one hand, and the national strategic goals defined
by the MEC, on the other. From 2021 onward, the funding will be divided into two parts, as
follows: two-thirds of the strategic funding will be based on the strategic goals of each
university and one-third on the national goals.
The MEC also uses project funding (4) as a steering mechanism. Project funding can be
used for different purposes, butmost often it is allocated to the implementation of the national
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higher education strategy. For instance, the national implementation of the Bologna process
has been supported by quite generous state project funding. The initiative for these projects
has come from the MEC, but the practical implementation has been in the hands of the
universities. As another example, from 2016 to 2020, 65m euros were allocated for so-called
Government Key Projects for developing university teaching and learning, especially the
digitalization of teaching and learning. There has also been project funding for the
development of education in the fields lacking a labor force and for lifelong learning. As these
examples show, project funding is used as a clear steering instrument, placing pressure on the
HEIs to support the national policy aims (MEC, 2019; Pyykk€o et al., 2019).
The regulation of the educational responsibility of the universities (5) is implemented
according to by the Universities’Act and the Decree on University Degrees. Provisions on the
degrees conferred by each university are given by governmental decree (Government Decree
onUniversityDegrees 794/2004) andmore explicitly by decree of theMEC (Decree of theMEC
clarifying the educational responsibilities of universities 1451/2014), which is prepared in
collaboration with the universities. The universities can decide on the establishment of new
programs in the field of their responsibility (e.g. educational responsibility in history allows
starting new specified programs in cultural history or Finnish history), but if they want to
widen the responsibility or stop offering a certain program under their responsibility, they
have to propose it to the MEC. Questions of educational responsibilities are in the interests of
not only the universities but also the regions and the labor market and are thus highly
political.
The ministry also uses steering by information (6),where different data play an important
role. Reliable and openly available statistics on higher education have been a part of the
Finnish education policy since the 1980s. Each year, each institution receives statistical data
on their rating in regard to other Finnish HEIs. All these data are used for the steering, follow-
up and development of higher education. Part of it also has a connection to university
funding. Online statistical data are openly available on the webpages of the MEC, the
Education Statistics Finland database (Vipunen), Statistics Finland and the Academy of
Finland.
3.3 Empirical material and data analysis
The empirical data of this study were collected by the FINEEC in 2019 as part of its external
evaluation of higher education in business and economics, engineering, the humanities and
social sciences. The aim of these field-specific evaluations was to go deeper into the
development needs of separate fields of education, which was not deemed possible in the
quality audits of HEIs. The evaluations were carried out by four external evaluation teams
consisting mainly of Finnish members. The evaluation teams comprised members of upper
management (vice-rectors and deans), professors and other teaching personnel and students
of HEIs as well as working-life representatives. Evaluations conducted by the FINEEC are
implemented according to the principles of enhancement-led evaluation (Pyykk€o et al., 2020a).
The evaluation teams formulated a self-assessment questionnaire common to all four
fields of education. The self-assessment survey was tested by four representatives of
different Finnish universities in February 2019, and the final survey was modified based on
the responses. The respondent teams completed the survey in March 2019. The data are
unique in that the survey was answered by teams of at least three people representing the
universities targeted. In addition, the response rate was exceptionally high at 94%.
The objective of the survey was to form an overall picture of how various factors impact
the development of the provision of education at HEIs and how impactful and purposeful the
different steering mechanisms are for the development of the education provision. The





A total of 33 field-specific small groups from 12 Finnish universities (7–10 per field,
Table 1) were asked about the impact and relevance of the different steering mechanisms on
the development of education provision [1]. The field-specific small groups included those
responsible for the degree program; those responsible for continued learning; students,
teaching and research staff; and administrative and support staff. One response per
university and field of education was requested for each field examined. In total, 31 responses
of the possible maximum of 33 were received [2]. Table 1 presents these data in terms of fields
of study. The fact that only three of the 12 universities provide education within all the four
fields of sciencemakes the comparison of findings between different universities problematic.
Therefore, the comparisons in this study take place only between different fields. As can be
seen from Table 1, all the evaluated fields are of similar size in Finland in terms of both the
number of schools and the number of degrees offered.
Four of the five authors of this article participated in the data collection, the data analysis
and the writing of the evaluation reports (see Pyykk€o et al., 2020a, 200b; Sepp€al€a et al., 2020;
Wallenius et al., 2020). For this study, the data sets from the different fields were combined
and reanalyzed [3]. The article applies both quantitative and qualitative methods, and our
approach can thus be labeled as mixed methods (see Modell, 2009).
The quantitative data of this article were collected from the part of the survey
questionnaire in which the respondents were asked to rate the relevance and impact of all of
the six steeringmechanisms applied by theMEC. As the field-specific small groups consisted
of the upper management and administration of the representative institutions and schools,
their responses can be considered as expert opinions representing each of the fields’ and
schools’ official views. The quantitative data analysis followed explorative logic (e.g.
Broadbent and Guthrie, 2008). Due to the size of the data set (n 5 31), multivariate analysis
was not possible. The impact and relevance of the six steeringmechanisms were thus studied
by comparing their means (descriptive statistics). While no actual hypothesis was set, the
logical expectation was that there would be a positive correlation between the perceived
impact and relevance of each of the steering mechanisms. Spearman’s rank-order correlation
was used to test this. The analysis of the means and Spearman’s correlation indicated
interesting findings, which we further pursued through a qualitative analysis of the open-
ended questions in the survey data.
Accordingly, the survey also contained the open-ended question: “How should the steering
mechanisms be developed?,”which was posed to all the respondent groups.There was a total
of 30 open-ended responses out of the possible 31 to this question. Using a qualitative content
analysis that can be labeled as conventional content analysis (Hsieh and Shannon, 2005), the
aim of the analysis was to gain an understanding on how the field-specific small groups
perceived the different steering mechanisms, their usefulness and the need to develop them
from the viewpoint of different fields of science. Next, the contents of the open-ended
questions were coded according to the themes emerging from the data. The themes that were
most prevalent, being mentioned in at least six different responses, were then selected to be
Field of study











10 10 1,869 2,145
Engineering 7 6 1,722 2,136
Humanities 8 8 1,926 1,666
Social sciences 8 7 1,383 1,632
Table 1.
Statistics in the four
fields studied Vipunen
(2020), Pyykk€o et al.
(2020a, p. 8)
JPBAFM
reported in the study. These themes help to explain and deepen the understanding on the
responses to the quantitative part of the survey describing the perceived impact and
relevance of the steering mechanisms.
Next, we will explain how the field-specific small groups perceived the relevance of the six
steering mechanisms (indicator-based funding, performance agreements between the MEC
and the individual universities, project funding, strategy-based funding, the regulation of the
educational responsibility of the universities and steering by information). Using both the
quantitative and qualitative data, the results highlight the paradoxical tension in the steering
of HEIs by demonstrating how the perceived relevance and impact of the steering
instruments vary.
4. Results of the empirical study
4.1 Quantitative analysis: experienced impact and relevance of the steering mechanisms
Table 2 presents the findings, listed from highest to lowest, based on the experienced impact
of the six steeringmechanisms applied by theMEC. The numbers presented inTable 2 are the
means based on the respondents’ answers as theywere asked to rate the relevance and impact
of each steering mechanism on a scale of 0–100 (the value 0 stands for no relevance/impact
and the value 100 for the highest possible relevance/impact). In the survey, the term “impact”
was used to measure the effect that a particular steering mechanism has on the planning of
the education provision within each field of science. The exact term used in the questionnaire
in Finnish that we have translated in this study as “impact” refers to the effects and influence
that the steering mechanism has in the long-term planning and development of each field of
science. Analogously, the term “relevance” was used to measure the appropriateness,
suitability and expediency that the respondents perceived each particular steering
mechanism as having on the planning and development of each field of science in the
long term.
Regarding the MEC’s steering mechanisms, Table 2 shows that the four mechanisms tied
to funding are also the ones that are perceived to have the most impact. Nevertheless, one of
the steering mechanisms, namely indicator-based funding, stands out. It seems to be not just
the most impactful steering mechanism but also the most controversial one. Consequently, in
the case of indicator-based funding, the difference between the experienced impact and the
relevance is strikingly high: 42.6. The fact that indicator-based funding was perceived as
the most impactful yet the least relevant steering mechanism entails an interesting paradox.
Unlike indicator-based funding, the rest of the steering mechanisms’ correlations were
logical – the higher the experienced impact of the steering mechanism was, the greater was
also the experienced relevance. Accordingly, while the Spearman’s rank-order correlation






Indicator-based funding 37.6 80.2 42.6
Performance agreements between the MEC and the
individual universities
52.8 77.7 24.9
Project funding 50.0 60.0 10.0
Strategy-based funding 47.5 59.9 12.4
Regulation of educational responsibility of the universities 47.4 56.7 9.3
Steering by information 43.2 45.7 2.5
Mean 46.4 63.3 16.9
Table 2.
Means of relevance and







indicator-based fundingwere to be excluded from the list, the rank-order correlationwould be
1, indicating a strong correlation.
Table 3 presents how the respondents from the four fields of science experience the
relevance and impact of the MEC’s steering mechanisms taken together. While the
respondents in the humanities experience the least relevance (43.9), their colleagues in
business and economics experience the highest relevance (50.5). Nevertheless, the difference
between the two is relatively small; the same applies to the differences regarding the
experienced impact.
4.2 Qualitative analysis: understanding the logics of high impact and low relevance
The results of the quantitative data analysis beg the question as to why the experienced
impact of the MEC’s steering mechanisms is higher than their experienced relevance; in
addition, we ask why the experienced relevance of indicator-based funding is so low in
particular? We approach the first question through qualitative data analysis, aiming to
understand why the experienced impact and relevance of the different steering mechanisms
vary. After this, in Section 5, we address the second question. We base our analysis on the
received responses to the open-ended survey question: “How should the steeringmechanisms
be developed?”
A content analysis of the qualitative data suggests the following five distinct themes,
which were mentioned more than six times in the data (the respective numbers after each
theme refer to the number of responses in which the theme was mentioned). The responses
indicated five problems in the steering of the HEIs that explain the difference between the
perceived impact and relevance of the steering mechanisms and highlight the tensions in the
steering of HEIs: (1) lack of predictability and long-term stability (18); (2) problems related to
project funding (9); (3) lack of core funding (8); (4) problems related to quality (8); and (5)
distortion problems (7). We take a closer look at these themes below.
By far, the most often mentioned problem (mentioned altogether in 18 responses) was the
lack of predictability and long-term planning in the MEC’s steering mechanisms. This theme
was typically explicitly stated in the responses:
Higher education institutions need predictable funding; the steering mechanisms should take into
account the universities’ long commitment periods for their students (7 years from entry).
(Respondent team from business and economics)
[There is a need for] long-termism, consistency, and predictability. (Respondent team from social
sciences)
The data suggest that the MEC’s steering mechanisms were typically considered to suffer
from unpredictability and myopia. Thus far, the MEC has been renewing its steering
mechanism (especially the means for allocating funding) often (e.g. Kallio et al., 2020) as the
standard cycle of updating the funding scheme and performance agreements is four years,
whereas the planned minimum time to complete both bachelor’s and master’s degrees is
typically five years. It is likely that this causes experiences of unpredictability and makes it
difficult for schools to design, plan and develop their education provision.
Field of education provision Relevance (mean) Impact (mean) Difference
Business and economics 50.5 61.5 11.1
Engineering 48.3 63.7 15.5
Humanities 43.9 67.3 23.3
Social sciences 50.0 69.0 19.0
Table 3.
The difference in the
means of relevance and
impact of the steering
mechanisms by field of
science
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Another theme that was often mentioned was the problems related to project funding.
These problems were typically associated with two issues in the responses. Firstly, the
project funding was perceived to be disconnected from the other activities of the universities,
meaning that the activities financedwith the project fundsmight not become integrated in the
university’s core activities, as illustrated in the following excerpt:
Projects may lead to individual development efforts, but there is a risk that the project will be
disconnected from the core activities, in which case its outcomes will die out at the end of the project.
(Respondent team from the humanities)
Secondly, project funding was considered problematic because projects are temporary, and
as such, they intensify the problems discussed above related to the theme of unpredictability
and myopia in steering the universities. Moreover, project funding was seen to increase the
administrative burden:
The steering mechanisms are too short-lived. The MEC’s project funding, for example, fragments
operations and causes an administrative burden. The steering should be based on the long-term
goals determined by the university itself. (Respondent team from business and economics)
It is indisputable that projects cause considerable administrative burden as applying for
projects, evaluating project applications and reporting on projects takes time, thus
consuming labor. Consequently, several responses pleaded for core funding to replace or
complement project- and performance-based funding. Hence, the lack of core funding was a
theme in the data that was typically mentioned as a general root of the problems within the
MEC’s performance-based funding:
[There is a need for] stable core funding so that the funding is not as strongly linked to performance.
Linking funding to performance does not necessarily contribute to the quality of education at the
national level, but to producing quantity in the short run. (Respondent team from business and
economics)
[There is a need] to get rid of MEC’s projects and [performance-based] funding, and provide the
university with a budget that the university can use according to the competence needs of the region
[of the respective university]. (Respondent team from engineering)
In Finland, core funding, proposed here as the solution to the identified problems by the field-
specific respondent groups, had comprised universities’ primary funding method before the
MEC adopted a performance-based funding scheme. Core funding operates differently
compared to performance-based funding; if thought of in terms of an employment contract,
the former could be seen as amonthly salary and the latter as a commission salary. The theme
describing the lack of core funding in the survey data was also connected to the next theme
found in the responses, namely problems related to quality in education. In the data, problems
related to quality were manifested in two interconnected ways. Firstly, the MEC’s steering
mechanisms were considered problematic because they measured mostly quantity:
It would be important to have more qualitative indicators and more qualitative ways to measure
performance. (Respondent team from engineering)
Secondly, applying PM-based steering in higher education was considered problematic from
the perspective of the quality as such:
Of course, the [performance-based] funding seems like an effective way to steer, but in the end it’s
pretty short-sighted from an educational quality perspective. (Respondent team from engineering)
Accordingly, it is not only difficult to develop indicators that are able to capture quality
aspects in higher education per se, but it is at least as difficult to define what quality means in





higher education (Kallio and Kallio, 2014; Kallio et al., 2017, 2020). As the fields of science
steered by theMEC range from theoretical physics all the way to folklore studies, it is difficult
to see how “one size” could possibly fit all in terms of measuring education quality. The final
problem identified in the analysis was labeled as distortion problems, meaning that the field-
specific respondent groups felt that applying the current steering mechanisms actually
distorts the education provision and thus scientific outputs in the long run.
[. . .] The strategy-based steering of theMECmay bias the overall development of the university as it
favors certain fields at the expense of others. [. . .] (Respondent team from the humanities)
[. . .] The steering mechanisms tend to pull the university-level development work in conflicting
directions and [consequently] ending up in short-sighted optimization of operations due to the
[MEC’s] funding scheme. (Respondent team from social sciences)
As illustrated by the above excerpts, some respondent teams, especially those representing
the humanities, feel that theMEC’s steeringmechanisms tend to favor certain fields (typically
pragmatic fields, such as business and engineering) at the expense of others (such as the
humanities). This causes distortion problems both at the university system level and at
the level of individual universities. The distortion problem is also at least implicitly linked to
the experienced lack of predictability in the MEC’s steering mechanisms.
The five problems discussed above are clearly major reasons behind the fact that the
experienced impact of the MEC’s steering mechanisms is higher than their experienced
relevance throughout. However, thus far we have only implicitly explained why the
experienced relevance of indicator-based funding is so low in particular. Next, with the help of
our theoretical lenses, the paradox theory and institutional complexity, we examine this
important question explicitly.
5. Understanding the tension between accountability and autonomy
In addition to the five problems identified in the data and presented above, the analysis
revealed a highly complex topic that was constantly present throughout the qualitative data,
namely autonomy. The idea that the MEC’s steering mechanisms interfered with the
autonomy of the universities manifested sometimes as an independent theme, as in the
following excerpts:
[. . .] Strict external steering is not justifiable from the perspective of universities’ autonomy.
(Respondent team from business and economics)
[It is necessary to enable] higher education institutions’ autonomy in developing their education.
(Respondent team from engineering)
Importantly, however, compared to the five problems discussed in Section 4, the theme of
autonomymanifested differently than the other problems. Accordingly, autonomy – or, more
specifically, the perceived loss of it – seems to be the actual root problem that is either
explicitly or implicitly connected to the other five problems. As a root problem, loss of
autonomy was highlighted by the respondents throughout the data, as illustrated by the
following exemplary excerpt:
[. . .] Strict steering does not support the diversity of science in the best possible way and will be
reflected in the education provision in the longer term. [. . .] (Respondent team from the humanities)
The above excerpt indicates that the actual paradox is not just the fact that the MEC’s most
impactful steering mechanism – indicator-based funding – was considered to be the least
relevant one by the respondent groups. Indicator-based funding, themost controversial of the
six steeringmechanisms, is, in fact, just a manifestation of a wider paradox. This observation
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led us to explore the dynamics of the paradox between the universities’ autonomy and the
universities’ accountability to the state on one hand and the paradox between the universities’
autonomy and the MECs coordination mechanisms on the other. As illustrated in Figure 2,
there are three logics (institutional complexity) affecting the demands imposed on the
universities, as follows: constitutional logic and quasi-market logic as the two variants of the
state logic as well as professional logic (see Thornton et al., 2012).
Figure 2 draws a wider picture of the Finnish higher education field from the perspective
of institutional complexity and paradoxes. In their operations and reactions, the three key
actors – the universities, the MEC and the state – each follow different institutional logics.
The outcome, institutional complexity in the Finnish higher education sector, entails both
mutually complementary and mutually contradictory demands and thus includes two types
of paradoxes.
The first of the two paradoxes revolves around the simultaneous demands for autonomy
and accountability, which are clearly at opposite ends of the spectrum from each other.
Nevertheless, the Finnish higher education field cannot exist without both autonomy and
accountability, and an attempt to eliminate either would thus lead to a dysfunctional
situation. In more practical terms, the Finnish state can ensure that its own constitution
(guaranteeing academic freedom and scientific independence) is upheld only by providing
autonomy to the universities. Vice versa, the universities would lose the legitimacy if they
were not accountable to the actor (the state) that is dictating the HEI field – the Finnish higher
education system is, after all, funded by the tax revenues, and there is only a marginal
number of alternative means available to fund higher education in the country. Living with
this persistent paradox (cf. Schad et al., 2016) means that the state and the universities need to
constantly “negotiate” ways that both autonomy and accountability can be implemented.
Consequently, even though the accountability versus autonomy tension between the state
and the universities is paradoxical, it is, in the end, a synergistic paradox (Smith and Tracey,
2016). This is illustrated in Figure 2 by the solid two-way arrow.
The universies
– Professional logic
– Professional experse to define educaon 
and research
– Accountability to the state
The Ministry of Educaon and Culture
– Quasi-market logic
– Creaon of steering mechanisms
– Control of outputs
The state
– Constuonal logic
– The Finnish constuon guaranteeing 
academic freedom and scienfic 
independence 












Another type of tension exists between the MEC and the universities. The role of the MEC
in the state administration is to execute the allocation of funding and the coordination of
educational responsibilities. In practice, this means that both creating the steering
mechanisms and being in control of the universities’ outputs in the state administration
belong to the responsibilities of the MEC. As suggested above, the empirical analysis of this
study indicates that the universities’ perceived loss of autonomy is the root problem caused
by the universities’ external steering mechanisms. If this interpretation holds true, it also
means that there is a contradictory paradox between universities’ autonomy and the steering
of HEIs defined by the MEC. This fact was mentioned either explicitly or implicitly in several
responses in the survey.
The MEC seems to be rather self-absorbed in its steering. The universities’ abilities to evaluate their
own development should be trusted. [. . .] (Respondent team from engineering)
[TheMEC] should listen the universities’ personnel; that is, those people that have to work according
to them [the steering mechanisms]. They have the expertise to evaluate if the steering mechanisms
are appropriate. (Respondent team from the humanities)
Accordingly, even though the freedom of science is secured by the Finnish constitution and
the autonomy of universities is guaranteed by the Universities Act, the steering mechanisms
applied by the MEC seem to undermine the universities’ self-rule (Kallio et al., 2020). The
outcome is a dysfunctional paradox, which is illustrated by the broken two-way arrow in
Figure 2.
While the relation between the state and the MEC has not been the focus of this study;
nevertheless, there seems to be a tension between the variants of the state logic that the MEC
and the state are operating under. It is as if the right hand and the left hand of the public
authority are not aware of each other and are pulling in different directions. This observation
leads to an intriguing question as to why the MEC, being part of the state organization itself,
has adopted such a perspective on accountability and further developed steering
mechanisms that are, at least implicitly, in conflict with the spirit of the constitution. As
Battilana and Lee (2014) suggest, a response might be that organizations exposed to different
institutional logics over a relatively long time period might become hybrid organizations in
which the logics they embody are not always compatible. This appears to be the case with
the MEC.
Consequently, this study supports the finding made by Battilana and Lee (2014) and thus
suggests that the reasons for the institutional complexity and the paradoxes lie in the cultural
and historical developments. Thus, the MEC’s operations are defined not just by the general
state logic but also by its variant labeled in this study as quasi-market logic (Grossi et al.,
2020). Moreover, one should bear in mind that even though the state institution is often
perceived as amonolith in practice, it is a loosely coupled organization built around numerous
autonomous ministries (12 in the Finnish case), which all have their own respective
administrations, history, values, purposes and demands. From this perspective, we can
conclude that the paradox related to the high impact and low relevance of the public steering
mechanisms of universities becomes understandable by analyzing the history of the
institutional fields involved. Therefore, we urge the scholars studying HEIs’ steering
mechanisms in different countries to pay more attention to the institutional evolution of the
respective higher education systems. (V€alimaa, 2012; Kallio et al., 2020).
6. Conclusions and practical remarks
We set three objectives for this study. The first of the tasks was to highlight the steering
mechanisms applied in coordinating the Finnish HEIs and report their experienced impact
and relevance. To do so, we studied the steering mechanisms developed by the MEC to
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coordinate HEIs and reported on their impact and relevance as described by representatives
of Finnish universities from four fields. The empirical analysis of this study showed that
there is a considerable gap between the experienced impact and the experienced relevance of
the ministry’s steering mechanisms in higher education. At least two of the MEC’s steering
mechanisms, namely indicator-based funding (mean 80.2) and the performance agreements
between theMEC and the individual universities (mean 77.7), seem to have amajor impact on
universities’ operations. At the same time, none of the MEC’s steering mechanisms were
considered particularly relevant. The difference between the experienced relevance and
impact of these two steering mechanisms was the highest (42.6 and24.9, respectively) in
the data. This means that even though some steering mechanisms are perceived as affecting
the planning and development of certain educational fields, their relevance in steering those
fields might be considered to be poor.
The second objective of the article was to gain an understanding as to why the applied
steering mechanisms cause tensions for the management of HEIs. Based on the empirical
analysis, we suggest that the steeringmechanisms cause tension for themanagement of HEIs
as their relevance is considered to be clearly lower than their impact. The low relevance is
connected to the following five generic problems: a lack of predictability and long-term
stability of the funding scheme, problems related to project funding, a lack of HEI core
funding, quality problems and distortion problems. In addition, we found a root problem that
was either explicitly or implicitly connected to all the other five themes. The root problem is
the perceived loss of autonomy experienced by the universities. Universities face the
paradoxical pressures to maintain their autonomy and to respond to the demands of the
different steeringmechanisms imposed on them by the state via themandate of theMEC. Our
analysis suggests that even the most impactful steering mechanisms can be considered of
little relevance if they endanger universities’ institutional autonomy at the same time. In this
sense, it could be expected that if steering mechanisms are to be perceived as simultaneously
impactful and relevant by professionals, they should be able to take into account both the
demands on accountability and autonomy at the same time. As suggested by de Boer et al.
(2015), the conditional funding mechanisms stand in contrast to lump-sum funding (core
funding), which is seen to fit institutional autonomy best. The authors pinpoint that there is a
tension between performance funding schemes and institutional autonomy, concluding that
the room left to the universities to make their own decisions and trade-offs, as well as to affect
the depth and scope of the agreements, is crucial. This means that the greater the level of
detail the steering instruments have, themore theywill intrude on the universities’ autonomy.
Based on our findings in this study, this holds true.
The third objective of the article was to provide practical insights into how to develop the
public steering of universities. Based on our analysis, we provide three suggestions. First, our
empirical data suggest that the predictability and farsightedness in applying steering
mechanisms via the stability of funding instruments should be a high priority in regard to
HEI steering. Accordingly, the frequency of renewing steering mechanisms, especially those
that involve the allocation of public funding, should not fluctuate. Improving the
predictability and farsightedness of the funding scheme should also mitigate the identified
problems related to quality and distortion.
Second, as universities’missions include functions connected to national education policy
goals, such as the responsibility to educate certain volumes in designed fields, long-term
predictability for the universities’ operations needs to be assured. Therefore, it would be
advisable for the universities’ basic funding to be secured so that it does not fluctuate
according to (short-term) performance. The paradox of fluctuating amounts of basic funding
and the need for scientific and educational stability brings tensions to the steering of HEIs.
Third, the steering mechanisms, in general, and indicator-based funding, in particular, are





stakeholders’ needs, but they should not cause quality and distortion problems, either. Even
though the formulation of Finnish higher education policy and steering has, in general, been
relatively inclusive to consider various stakeholder perspectives, our analysis indicates that
when next renewing the performance-based funding scheme, finding an acceptable balance
between accountability and institutional autonomy should be a key objective. Only through
adequate autonomy can universities ensure that the education they offer remains of high
quality and does not become distorted.
Our study contributes to earlier literature by, first, highlighting the tensions between
autonomy and accountability in performance-based steering models of public sector
organizations and, second, by explaining them through the lenses of institutional complexity
and the paradox theory. As suggested by Grossi et al. (2020), diverging logics can coexist in a
university context but can still be quite separate and not fully blended. In a similar vein, our
study concludes that, in Finland, the state logic with its two variants (constitutional and
quasi-market logic) and the professional logic coexist yet still creating a paradox since they
are all affected by different demands. As suggested by Smith and Tracey (2016), rather than
trying to resolve the competing demands, paradox theory pursues ways to cope with them
and potentially even develop positive outcomes. One way to do this is to try to make the
performance agreements and performance funding schemes truly joint efforts between the
MEC and the universities, where both parties can express their interests on a limited number
of issues, thereby leaving the universities some room on how to approach them, as suggested
by de Boer et al. (2015). Based on our study, we conclude that attention should be paid to the
competing and paradoxical tensions created by the multitude of operating logics of the
performance-based steering of universities. Therefore, accountability and autonomy should
be better balanced when designing performance-based funding schemes for universities.
Notes
1. Although the FINEEC’s survey reported in this study was explicitly targeted only to the education
provision of the universities, many respondents might have had the whole funding model in mind.
2. However, representatives of one faculty/school did not respond to all the questions, meaning that the
exact number of responses ranged from 28 to 31.
3. Even though the empirics of this article are based on the data of the FINEEC’s evaluations, the data
set, the empirical analysis and the findings presented in this article have never been published.
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